The estimated interest rate rules are reduced form equations and for that reason they do not directly reveal anything about the structural parameters of monetary policy. In this paper, we seek to further elucidate the Brazilian monetary policy under the inflation targeting regime by calibrating Central Bank preferences. More specifically, we calibrate the policymaker's loss function by choosing the preference parameter values which minimize the deviation between the optimal and actual paths of the basic interest rate (Selic). Our results indicate that the Central Bank has adopted a flexible inflation target regime and placed some greater weight upon inflation stabilization. We also find out that the monetary authority's concern with interest rate smoothing has been far deeper than with output stabilization.
Introduction
Since the influential study by John B. Taylor (1993) , interest rate rules have been commonly used to describe the behavior of monetary policy. In Brazil, these policy rules have been estimated by several authors in order to assess the Central Bank's response to macroeconomic variables (such as inflation, output and exchange rate), and also to indicate possible monetary policy regime shifts. 1 Theoretically, interest rate rules can be formally derived from the solution of a restricted intertemporal optimization problem in which the monetary authority tries to minimize the squared deviations of the objective variables from their respective targets.
2
Following this theoretical framework, monetary policy rule coefficients are convolutions of economic model parameters that restrict the optimization problem, as well as of parameters describing the monetary authority's preferences. As the estimated interest rate rules are just reduced form equations, the estimation of their coefficients do not directly reveal anything about the structural parameters of the monetary policy (e.g., about the policymaker's preferences). In addition, differences in the estimated interest rate rule coefficient values should not be viewed as monetary policy regime shifts because they may result from changes in the parameters of the macroeconomic model. Thus, a way to shed further light upon monetary policy decisions is by extracting the loss function preference parameters of the policymaker from the estimated interest rate rules. Obtaining the estimates for the monetary authority's preferences allows: i) knowledge of the variables that are included in the loss function; and ii) checking whether the economic results can be reconciled with the optimal monetary policy structure.
The aim of the present paper is to estimate the preferences of the Central Bank of Brazil in the current inflation targeting regime. To achieve that, we calibrate the loss function by choosing the preference parameter values from a wide range of alternative policies, which minimize the deviation between the simulated and actual paths of the Selic rate. The advantage of the calibration exercise over maximum likelihood estimates lies in the fact that it does not depend on the assumption about the distribution of error terms found in equations that restrict the monetary authority's optimization problem. On 1 See, for instance, Silva and Portugal (2001) , Minella et al. (2002 Minella et al. ( , 2003 , Salgado et al. (2005) ad Bueno (2005) . 2 See, for example, Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) . the other hand, the fact that it does not produce standard deviations for the policymaker's preferences does not allow testing the statistical significance of the estimates. To circumvent this problem, we estimate both the parameters of a model that restricts the optimization problem and the parameters of the Central Bank's objective function that best fit the data, using the maximum likelihood method.
Most of the economic literature that seeks to estimate the monetary authority's preferences and objectives has focused attention on the Federal Reserve (Fed). For example, Salemi (1995) identifies the Fed's loss function parameters in the post-World War II period using a linear quadratic optimal control structure and assuming that the economy can be described by a vector autoregressive (VAR) model. Ozlale (2003) and Dennis (2006) consider that the economy can be described by the model proposed by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) , using an infinite-horizon quadratic loss function and estimating the Fed's preferences by maximum likelihood. Favero and Rovelli (2003) argue that the Fed is concerned only with the effect of its decision over a quarterly time frame and uses GMM to estimate the monetary authority's preferences. Dennis (2004) estimates the monetary policy objective function by using a New Keynesian sticky price model, in which families and firms are forward-looking, in order to restrict the optimization problem. Söderlind et al. (2002) and Castelnuovo and Surico (2003) estimate the Fed's preferences by means of a calibration exercise. The results obtained by these studies suggest that the Fed has placed considerable weight on interest rate smoothing and given lesser or unsubstantial importance to the output gap during the Volcker-Greenspan period. Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999) , Cecchetti et al. (2001) and Collins and Siklos (2004) extend the analysis of monetary authority's preferences to other countries besides the U.S. Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999) use VAR models to capture the economic dynamics of 23 countries (including both developed and developing economies) and to identify the preferences of central banks by way of estimates of inflation-output variability. Results suggest that central banks developed stronger aversion to inflation variability in the course of the 1990s. Cecchetti et al. (2001) estimate the preferences of central banks of countries in the European Monetary System and demonstrate that the objective functions of these monetary authorities are surprisingly alike. By utilizing a calibration strategy, Collins and Siklos (2004) show that the central banks of Australia, Canada, U.S. and New Zealand can be described as having an optimal inflation target, placing considerable weight on short-term interest rate smoothing and attaching sheer weight on output variability.
The present paper contributes to the available empirical literature as it introduces novel estimates for the preferences of the Central Bank of Brazil during the inflation targeting regime. The results reveal that the Brazilian monetary authority has adopted a flexible inflation targeting regime and attached greater importance to inflation stabilization. We also found out that the monetary authority's concern with interest rate smoothing has been far deeper than with output stability.
In addition to this introduction, the paper is organized into six sections. Section 2 outlines the theoretical model and the monetary authority's intertemporal optimization problem. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology used to calibrate the policymaker's preferences. Section 4 provides and analyzes the results for the calibration exercises. Section 5 shows the estimates obtained by maximum likelihood for the monetary authority's weights. Section 6 concludes.
The theoretical model

Structure of the economy
In this paper, we consider a simple structural macroeconomic model for an open economy with backward-looking expectations. The model is based on Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and Freitas and Muinhos (2001) . The three equations that form the model are: 
where π t is the annualized quarterly inflation rate, q t is the nominal exchange rate, y t is the output gap (calculated as the gap between real and potential GDP in percentage points) and r t is the real interest rate, defined as the difference between the nominal exchange rate regarded as monetary policy instrument, i t , and the inflation rate, π t . The error terms ε π,t , ε y,t and ε q,t -assumed to be normally, identically and independently distributed (N.I.I.D) with zero mean and constant variances -can be interpreted as supply shocks, demand shocks and exchange rate shocks, respectively. All variables are expressed as deviation from the mean (demeaned); therefore, no constant appears in system (1)-(3).
Phillips curve (1) shows that the current inflation rate depends on its lagged values, on the nominal exchange rate fluctuations in the previous period and on the output gap with a two-period lag. 3 Equation (2) is a conventional IS curve where the output gap at time t depends on its lagged values and on the real interest rate (r t =i t -π t ) in the previous period. In equation (3), we follow Freitas and Muinhos (2001) and Moreira et al. (2007) and assume that the nominal exchange rate follows a random walk. The expected signs for the responses of inflation rate to exchange rate fluctuations and to output gap are α 5 > 0 and α 6 > 0. However, the coefficient that measures the response of the output gap to the real interest rate (β 3 ) is expected to have a negative value.
Although model (1)-(3) is parsimonious, it has two advantages: i) it simplifies the solution to the monetary authority's optimization problem; and ii) it includes an important channel regarding the monetary policy transmission mechanism: the aggregate demand channel. Specifically, the model implies that a contractionary monetary policy, implemented through a rise in i t , reduces the output gap after one quarter and, consequently, reduces the inflation rate after three quarters. This assumption appears to be consistent with the macroeconomic models implemented by the Central Bank of Brazil, which predict that the aggregate demand channel of the monetary transmission mechanism takes 6 to 9 months to go into full operation (Bogdanski et al., 2000 ; Inflation Report issued by the Central Bank of Brazil, March 2000).
The Central Bank's problem and the optimal monetary policy rule
Following Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) , we assume that the monetary authority seeks to choose a path for the policy instrument (the nominal interest rate) so as to minimize:
where E t is the expectations operator conditional on the set of information available at t, δ is the discount rate (0 <δ <1), λ π >0, λ y ≥0 and λ i ≥0. 5 See Appendix 4 for time-varying inflation targets. 6 As shown by Dennis (2006) , expressing all variables as deviations from the mean does not change the derivation of the monetary authority's preferences. 7 For a theoretical and empirical analysis of interest rate smoothing, see Clarida et al. (1997) , Sack (1998) , Woodford (1999) , Sack and Wieland (2000) and Srour (2001) .
second-order approximation of the intertemporal utility function of the representative agent (Woodford, 2003) .
The monetary authority is supposed to minimize intertemporal loss function (4) subject to the restriction given by structural model (1)-(3). This model has an appropriate state-space representation, which can be denoted by:
Where the column vector X t of state variables, matrix A, column vector B and the column vector of disturbances ε t+1 are given by 
The loss function at time t can be written in matrix notation. To do that, first it is necessary to express the monetary authority's vector of objective variables as a function of the vector of state variables and of the control variable (nominal interest rate) as follows: 
Thus, the loss function can be written as:
Where superscript T indicates the transpose of a vector (or matrix) and K is a 3x3 matrix with the main diagonal equal to (λ π , λ y , λ i ) and all remaining elements equal to zero.
The monetary authority's optimization problem can be viewed as a stochastic linear regulator problem denoted by: 
Where maximization is subject to (6). As shown in Hansen and Sargent (2004) , the quadratic value function V(X t ) which satisfies Bellman's equation is given by:
where
where tr is the trace of matrix P and Σ εε is the covariance matrix of the vector of disturbances ε t . Matrix P is positive semidefinite symmetric and satisfies the algebraic matrix Riccati equation, defined as:
The monetary authority's optimal interest rate rule is denoted by:
Equation (17) After obtaining optimal policy rule (17), the model dynamics is determined by:
8 For further details, see Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) and Hansen and Sargent (2004) .
where matrices M and C are given by
Empirical calibration strategy for Central Bank preferences
A broadly used strategy for identifying the monetary authority's preferences is their consistent calibration with the data (Söderlind et al., 2002; Castelnuovo and Surico, 2003 and Castelnuovo, 2004; Collins and Siklos, 2004) . According to Castelnuovo and Surico (2003) , the advantage of this empirical strategy over estimation methods such as maximum likelihood and GMM is that it is more robust to the misspecification of the error term. This occurs because this strategy is not reliant upon the distributions of shocks observed in the economic model that restricts the policymaker's optimization. In addition, the calibration strategy relatively facilitates the demonstration and interpretation of the effects of changes in the calibrated parameters.
In this paper, the calibration strategy used to identify the preferences of the Central Bank of Brazil can be split into four stages. First, we estimate the parameters of each equation for structural model (1)-(3). These estimates enter system (6) and restrict the monetary authority's intertemporal optimization problem. In the second stage, we calculate the coefficients for optimal interest rate rule (17) 
Results
Macroeconomic model estimates for Brazil
As described in the previous section, the first stage necessary for the calibration of the monetary authority's loss function parameters consists in estimating the structural macroeconomic model that restricts this policymaker's optimization problem. As macroeconomic model (1)- (3) contains backward-looking expectations, the derivation of the optimal policy rule is based on the assumption that the parameters are invariant to policy regime shifts, thus being amenable to Lucas's criticism (1976) . Therefore, we estimate Phillips and IS curves, shown in equations (1) and (2) ii) output gap (y t ): percentage difference between the seasonally adjusted quarterly real GDP and the potential output obtained through the Hodrick-Prescott filter;
9 The floating exchange rate regime was adopted in Brazil in January 1999 after four years of an exchange rate crawling peg regime. The inflation targeting regime was implemented 6 months after the floating exchange rate regime was adopted. 10 The graphs for the series used are shown in Appendix 1. the optimal number of lagged difference terms to be included in each regression, k, based on the Schwarz information criterion. 11 The maximum autoregressive order was equal to eight. For the inflation rate and the real interest rate, the tests were done using a constant, whereas for the exchange rate, a linear trend was also used. 
where 4 The results for the estimations of the Phillips and IS curves are shown in Table 2 (the value in brackets refers to the standard error deviation). Note that the parameter estimates obtained by OLS for the two equations are quite similar to those obtained by SUR and FIML. However, estimation by FIML yielded a larger number of statistically nonsignificant parameters comparatively to the alternative methods. This inaccuracy regarding FIML estimates may occur due to the small sample size used. We checked for the presence of autocorrelation, autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) and non-normality of errors in the Phillips and IS curves.
According to the Ljung-Box (LB) test, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the residuals of both equations are serially uncorrelated. The ARCH test results do not indicate the presence of statistically significant autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity of the residuals of the estimated equations. Finally, the Jarque-Bera test, at a 5% significance level, shows that the residuals of both equations are normally distributed. This set of results suggests that the estimated equations are well-specified.
Central Bank preferences in the inflation targeting regime
In this section, we seek to estimate the Central Bank's loss function parameters by choosing the weights that cause a smaller squared deviation of the optimal path from the actual path of the Selic rate. The optimal interest rate path is obtained on a periodby-period basis by insertion of state variable actual values in the optimal monetary policy rule. Since the parameter values for the Phillips and IS curves are known, the optimal policy rule and, consequently, the optimal path for the policy instrument depend on the weights the monetary authority attaches to inflation and output gap stabilization and to interest rate smoothing.
To start the calibration process, we chose the parameter estimates of the The calibration results for the Central Bank's loss function are presented in Table 3 . For each value of λ i, , we provide the weights λ π and λ y which produce a smaller squared deviation (SD). Initially, we noticed that when the monetary authority is supposedly not concerned with the smoothing of the monetary policy instrument, the squared deviation of the optimal interest rate from the actual interest rate is extremely large. This suggests that the Central Bank has given a positive weight to interest rate smoothing in its loss function. 13 The calibration results for the loss function weights with the parameter estimates of the macroeconomic model by SUR and FIML are shown in Appendices 2 and 3. We also realized that for λ i parameter values between 0 and 0.1, combinations {λ π , λ y } which produce smaller squared deviations reveal a deeper concern of the policymaker with the output gap than with inflation. The opposite occurs for the weights placed on interest rate smoothing that are greater than 0.10. For instance, when λ i =0.7, the weight given to inflation is virtually equal to 0.3, whereas the weight given to the output gap is almost zero.
Finally, the results shown in Table 3 indicate that the loss function parameters that minimize the squared deviation between the optimal path and the actual path of the Selic rate are λ π =0.727, λ y =0.073 and λ i =0.2.
14,15 This demonstrates that the Central Bank of Brazil has adopted a flexible inflation targeting regime and placed a heavier weight on price stability than on output gap stability. Moreover, we perceived that the monetary authority's concern with interest rate smoothing has been far deeper than with output stability.
Optimal monetary policy rule
The parameter estimates of the macroeconomic model and of the loss function imply that the optimal monetary policy, shown in equation (17), is given by: Taylor (1993) and observe that the Central Bank responds more often to inflation (1.99 here vis-à-vis 1.5 in Taylor) and to the output gap (1.09
here vis-à-vis 0.5 in Taylor) than does the Federal Reserve. Figure 1 shows the optimal path of the Selic rate associated with the Central Bank preferences obtained by the calibration strategy (Selicf) and the actual path of the Selic rate (Selic). 16 In general, we can observe that the optimal policy captures the major interest rate movements in the inflation targeting regime. However, some discrepancies exist. For example, we notice that a policymaker with calibrated weights would have maintained the Selic rate above the rate observed throughout the 2000:3-2001:1 period.
Optimal path versus the actual path of the Selic rate
In addition, in the third quarter of 2000, the monetary authority's optimal decision would have been to increase the Selic rate in response to inflation pressures produced by the mark-up of the prices of agricultural products and so-called "administered items"
(e.g.: telephone services, light bill, and fuel). Conversely, the Central Bank adopted an expansionary policy, making the actual Selic rate deviate further away from the optimal Selic rate. Finally, we perceived that the monetary policy decisions taken ever since the second quarter of 2006 were quite close to the optimal policy, with a mean difference of -0.06% percentage points. This result seems to rule out the possibility that the Central Bank adopted a conservative behavior by reducing the interest rate during the past two years.
Comparison with alternative weights for the loss function
It is useful to compare the monetary policy rule obtained from calibrated weights for the loss function with the rules associated with different weights. Here, we contemplate five sets of alternative weights. Table 4 summarizes the characteristics of the analyzed cases. The first case deals with the set of weights of a policymaker who adopts a strict inflation targeting regime (King, 1997) . In the second case, the weights for the loss function are those used by Svensson and Rudebusch (1999) when deriving the optimal monetary rules for the Federal Reserve and represent a flexible inflation targeting regime in which the monetary authority equally weights inflation and output stabilization and smoothes the interest rate. The third case differs from the previous one because there is no concern with interest rate smoothing. This set of weights is particularly important since it was used by Almeida et al. (2003) and Moreira et al. (2007) for obtaining optimal monetary policy rules for the Brazilian economy. The fourth case is the set of weights calibrated by our calibration strategy. Cases 5 and 6 represent combinations {λ π, λ y } which minimize the squared deviation of the observed interest rate from the optimal interest rate for values of λ i equal to 0.5 and 0.9. In the fifth case, the policymaker uses similar weights for inflation stabilization and interest rate smoothing, and a near-zero weight for the output. The sixth case deals with a monetary authority that is deeply concerned with interest rate smoothing. Table 5 shows the optimal monetary rules for the six cases described above. We can notice that values for the policy rule coefficients and for the squared deviation (SD) between the optimal and the observed interest rates are way above those found for the calibrated weights (case 4) in the set of weights in which there is no concern with interest rate smoothing.
For the set of weights considered by Svensson and Rudebusch (1999) , the longrun optimal monetary policy rule implies that the interest rate is less sensitive to inflation and output gap than in case 4. Despite that, the squared deviation and the mean absolute error (MAE) suggest no major differences between the actual Selic rate and the optimal Selic rate in both cases.
By comparing the optimal monetary rule in case 4 with those of cases 5 and 6, we note that a greater weight on interest rate smoothing causes larger gradualism in monetary policy and, consequently, a larger squared deviation of the optimal interest rate from the interest rate which was actually observed. The optimal path of the Selic rate in each of the cases above (Selicf) is shown in Figure 2 along with the actual path of the Selic rate (Selic). Under the monetary policies of a policymaker who attaches exclusive importance to inflation (case 1) or with no concern with policy instrument smoothing (case 3), we found that the Selic rate would vary considerably, showing positive values with up to four digits in some periods and negative values in other periods. 17 This strongly suggests that the Central Bank has not used any of these sets of weights for its loss function.
For those cases in which the weight on the interest rate smoothing is positive, we noted that the optimal Selic rate can adjust reasonably well to the observed Selic rate.
However, simulations indicate that a policymaker whose primary goal is to smoothe the interest rate would have shown larger lags in response to the rise in inflation in 2002, and also kept the interest rate persistently above that which had been observed in the past two years. On the other hand, for cases 2 and 4, we noted that the optimal paths for the interest rate were quite similar throughout the period, differing only in the last two 17 We do not impose the restriction of non-negativity on the nominal interest rate.
years where calibrated weights imply an optimal Selic rate that closely resembles the observed Selic rate. Even though the visual inspection of optimal paths for the Selic rate is informative, it is not necessarily conclusive. Because of that, we used the encompassing test proposed Chong and Hendry (1986) . On this test, we specify the path of the Selic rate resulting from the calibrated weights (case 4) vis-à-vis each of the five sets of weights shown in Table 4 . The purpose is to decide whether the calibrated weights statistically predominate over the rival ones, i.e., whether they explain the behavior of the observed Selic rate in a more appropriate way. For that, we estimate the 
The results of the encompassing tests, shown in Table 6 , confirm the visual impressions obtained from Figure 2 . We note that the weights of a policymaker with strict inflation targets (case 1) can be readily disregarded since they are dominated by calibrated weights. Analogously, we observe that the Central Bank does not appear to have adopted a weight equal to 0.5 for price and output gap stabilization. When we compare the calibrated weights with the cases in which interest rate smoothing is the Central Bank's main goal (cases 5 and 6), the hypothesis that the calibrated weights encompass these two cases is not rejected either. Finally, the predominance of calibrated weights over the weights considered by Svensson and Rudebusch (1999) is only observed at an 11% significance level. 18 As the optimal monetary rule for the calibrated weights produces a smaller squared deviation and mean absolute error than does case 2, it is reasonable to assume that the Central Bank has conducted the monetary policy by prioritizing inflation stabilization, but that it has brushed output stabilization and Selic rate smoothing aside.
Estimating Central Bank preferences
An empirical procedure other than calibration consists in estimating the monetary authority's preferences and the structural economic parameters by using maximum likelihood (Dennis, 2006) . As pointed out in Section 2, given the values of the Phillips curve coefficients, of the IS curve coefficients and of the loss function parameters, the dynamics of the system is determined by:
After the optimal monetary policy rule has been determined, the solution to the monetary authority's optimization problem can be expressed as follows:
where 4 1 2 3 1 α α α α α = − − − − . The variable ε i,t is an error term introduced in the policy rule to represent possible measurement errors. This procedure, initially suggested by Hansen and Sargent (1980) , is justified by the fact that an econometrician has less available information than the monetary authority when estimating the monetary policy 18 When we use the parameter estimates of the Phillips and IS curves obtained by SUR and FIML, this result is observed only at a 16% significance level (see Appendices 2 and 3). However, for the model where inflation targets vary over time, calibrated weights predominate over the weights proposed by Svensson and Rudebusch (1999) at a 5% significance level (see Appendix 4). rule and, therefore, he could remove some variables from the model. In addition to the where T a is the sample size including the initial conditions. The term 
is the maximum likelihood estimator of Σ εε .
We estimate the vector of parameters ϖ by the maximization of (36) and we use (37) to find an estimate for the variance-covariance matrix Σ εε . The numerical optimization was performed using the BFGS (Broyden, Fletcher, Goldfarb and Shanno) algorithm described in Gill et al. (1981) .
The variance-covariance matrix of ϖ, necessary for us to infer on the estimates of structural coefficients, can be built by the inversion of Fischer information matrix:
[ ] 
Estimation results
The estimation results for system (34) are shown in Table 7 . Except for parameter α 2 , the estimates had the expected signs. Once again, we observed that exchange rate depreciations remarkably affect the inflation rate, while the effect of economic activity on prices may not be considered to be different from zero. In the IS curve, we noted that the effects of changes in the real interest rate on the output gap are statistically significant. For the three estimated equations, the LB and JB tests indicate that we cannot reject the null hypotheses that the errors are serially uncorrelated and normally distributed.
The values obtained for the relative weights on output stabilization and interest rate smoothing are equal to 0.0996 and 0.7036, which implies that the absolute weights are λ π =0.555, λ y =0.055 and λ i =0.39. However, the standard errors reveal great inaccuracy regarding the estimation of relative weights, not allowing for the rejection of the null hypotheses that these weights are equal to zero. A possible explanation for this is that the sample we used contains a small number of information so that we can extract and accurately estimate the loss function weights along with the parameters of the macroeconomic model. 19 In addition, the statistical nonsignificance of the relative weights λ' y and λ' i should be viewed with extreme caution because, as we could see in Figure 1 in Section 4.2, a policymaker with strict inflation targets would cause interest rate variability that is not compatible with the path actually observed for the Selic rate. The optimal monetary rule policy resulting from the estimates shown in Table 7 is given by: rates than the policymaker with calibrated weights, whereas the opposite situation would be observed in 2003. The result of these differences can be measured by the mean absolute error (MAE). For the estimated weights, the MAE between the optimal interest rate and the observed one was 1.08 percentage points, whereas for the weights obtained via calibration, the MAE was 1.01 percentage points. This suggests that the weights obtained using our calibration strategy described the decisions made by the Central Bank more appropriately within an optimal monetary policy framework. The log-likelihood for the VAR(4) model in which the policy rule coefficients are unrestricted was equal to -228.21. As the structure of equations for inflation, output gap and exchange rate remains unchanged, we can note that there are eight free parameters in the unrestricted system (the unrestricted policy rule coefficients), whereas in the restricted system there are only two (λ' y and λ' i ). This shows that the system in which the monetary policy is adjusted optimally implies six restrictions on the unrestricted policy rule (40). The value of the likelihood ratio (LR=15.42) implies that we can reject the null hypothesis that the monetary policy was adjusted optimally to a 5% instead of to a 1% significance level.
Conclusions
In the past two decades, a large amount of empirical studies have assessed central bank actions through monetary policy estimates. However, this procedure can be problematic because the estimated reaction functions are reduced form equations whose coefficients are convolutions of the monetary authority's preferences and of the economic behavioral patterns.
Therefore, the present paper aimed to shed further light upon the Brazilian monetary policy in the inflation targeting regime by way of calibration of Central Bank preferences. To do that, we assumed that the monetary authority solves an intertemporal optimization problem restricted to a small macroeconomic model using backwardlooking expectations. Thereafter, we calibrated the policymaker's loss function by choosing the preference parameter values that minimize the deviation of the optimal path from the observed path of the Selic rate from a wide range of alternative policies.
Our results show that the Central Bank of Brazil has conducted a monetary policy that prioritizes inflation stabilization, but which has given no importance to output gap stabilization and to Selic rate smoothing. In addition, we conclude that the monetary authority's concern with interest rate smoothing has been far deeper than with output stability.
As an alternative to the calibration strategy, we estimated the Central Bank's objective function parameters along with the parameters of the macroeconomic model using maximum likelihood. Results indicate that the estimates for the relative weights on output gap stabilization and interest rate smoothing were qualitatively similar to those obtained by the calibration method, but statistically nonsignificant. The inaccuracy of these estimates is possibly due to the small sample size used. Moreover, the statistical nonsignificance of relative weights should not be seen as evidence in favor of a central bank with strict inflation targets because, under this assumption, the optimal Selic rate may vary considerably to the point that it becomes incompatible with the observed Selic rate.
Appendix 1 -Graphs for the series used Appendix 2 -Calibration results using SUR estimates Table 2 in the text). For equation (46), the estimate for coefficient γ was equal to 0.8606 (p value=0.0000). We assumed that the discount factor, δ, is equal to 0.98. The results for the calibration strategy, shown in Table A7 , indicate that the Central Bank has attached greater weight to inflation stabilization, showing a deeper concern with interest rate smoothing, and given a near-zero weight to output stabilization. In Table A8 , we present the monetary policy rule associated with the calibrated weights (case 4) and with other sets of alternative weights. In Table A9 , we run the encompassing test between calibrated and alternative weights. Results indicate that the set of calibrated weights is more appropriate to describe the Central Bank's actions than all the other sets of weights analyzed. 
